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-Where an insurance policy provides that no action thereon for the
xecovery of any claim shall be sustained, "unless commenced within
twelve months next after thefire," the time limited begins to run from
the date of the fire, and not from the time when the liability is fixed, and
the right of action accrues.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS WITH REFERENCE TO INSURANCE
CONTRACTS.
The general statutes of limitations of the several states
require or permit an action to be brought on contracts within
a specified time, and not thereafter. Various periods are pre-
scribed by the different laws for the bringing of actions on
different kinds of contracts, whether in writing or not. The
period, within which contracts in writing must be sued on, is
generally longer than in instances of verbal agreements, and, in
some states, if the obligation or undertaking is under seal, or
is a bond, the time, within which an action may be brought,
is even longer than in cases of ordinary written contracts.
The various statutes of limitation usually provide that actions
on written contracts must be brought within five years and on
verbal contracts within three years from the accrual of the
right of action. The period of limitation prescribed by con-
tracts of insurance, however, is usually either six or twelve
I Reported in 86 Wisc. 77.
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months from the time of the loss, death, accident, etc., as the
case may be. While there may be instances, in which an
insurance company would be liable on an oral contract entered
into between the assured and an agent of the company
authorized to bind it, as where the agent agreed with the
assured that the company should be bound from a certain
time, the rate, amount, etc., being agreed upon and under-
stood, but for the delay of the agent the policy is not written
and delivered till after the loss. Contracts of insurance are
almost uniformly evidenced by an undertaking in writing. The
general statute, we will say, limits the time of bringing an
action on a written obligation to five years. The contract of
insurance, however, on the other hand, expressly stipulates
t at no action shall be brought, nor recovery had, unless suit
be instituted within a year, or six months from the time of the-
fire, death, accident, etc., etc. But the insurance contract is.
supposed in law to reflect the identical agreement and under-
taking between the parties, as w ell as all conditions precedent,
which may be embodied therein, and when it is stipulated in
the contract of insurance that no action shall be brought
except within twelve months next after the loss, no action can
thereafter be brought, as a general rule, notwithstanding
the provision of the general statute of limitation that it may
be brought within five years. The express contract of the
parties and the stipulations to which they agree in that con-
tract, supplants, for the purposes of an action on the policy,
the general statute of limitations. From an early time in the
history of the jurisprudence of this country, the courts have
adopted and adhered to this holding in a uniform and un-
broken line of decisions, which hold the limitation in the
policy to a shorter time than the general statute, valid and
.binding: Fullnan v. Ls. Co., 7 Gray, 61 ; Cray v. Ins. Co., i
Blatchf., 280; O'Laughiin v. Ins. Co., II Fed. Rep. 281 ;
Moore v. Ins. CO., 72 Iowa, 414 ; Virginia Fire & Marine Ins.
C0. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736; Riddlesbarger v. Ins. Co., 7 Wall-
386; Vefte v. Is. Co., 3o Fed. Rep. 668 ; "T1Yo;plsov v. Ins-
Co., 25 Fed. Rep. 296 ; Dwelling House Its. Co. v. Brodie, 52
Ark. II; Tasker v. Ins. Co., 58 N. H. 469; Brown v. Ins. Co.,
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5 R. I. 394; Woodbury Savings Bank v. Ins. Co., 3 1 Conn.
517 ; Chambers v. Ins. Co., 51 Conn. 17 ; Wilkinson v. Ins. Co.,
72 N. Y. 499; lVerchants' kAldtual Ins. Co. v. Lacroix, 35
Tex. 245 ; McFarland v. Ins. Co., 6 W. Va. 425 ; Virginia
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Aikin, 82 Va. 424 ; Suggfs v. Trav-
ellers' Inzs. Co., 71 Tex. 579. Indeed, so uniform and unbend-
ing is this holding of the courts that, though the parties to
whom the loss may be payable are infants and incapable of
suing, unless, perhaps, by guardian, prochein ami, or in other
representative capacity, they will be bound by the stipulation
in the policy: O'Laughlin v. Ins. Co., I I Fed. Rep. 28o;
Suggs v. Ins. Co., 71 Tex. 579.
And where it. was stipulated in the policy that no action
should be sustained unless brought within twelve months, and
a suit was commenced within the twelve months, but failed
without fault of the assured, it was held, nevertheless, that
another action could not be begun after the expiration of the
year: Wilson v. Ins. Co., 27 Vt. 99. Nor will the fact that a
statute of a state, which permits a new action to be brought
on the same contract at any time within a year after a non-
suit suffered in the first action, change the rule. Such a sta-
tute existed in Missouri, and an action was commenced by a
policy-holder in that state in apt time, but was dismissed by
the plaintiff of his own motion. He brought a new action on
the same policy within a year after the voluntary dismissal,
and sought to excuse the delay in bringing suit by reason of
this statute. But it was held that the stipulation in the policy
that the action should be brought not later than a year from
the loss, controlled, and that assured could not rely on the
limitation of one year after the non-suit within which to sue:
]?iddlesbarger v. Harford Fire Ins. Co., 7 Wall. 386.
The question whether the limitation period shall be con-
strued to commence from the date of the fire, death, etc.,
strictly speaking, or whether it shall be held to begin to run
only after the accrual of the cause of action under the terms
of the contract of insurance, is one upon which the courts are
very much divided. The following cases hold that the limita-
tion period does not begin to run until a cause of action arises
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under the contract: Mayor, etc. v. Ins. Co., 39 N. Y. 45;
Malier v. Ins. Co., 89 N. Y. 315 ; Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Buckstaff (Neb.), 56 N. W. R. 697; Steel v. Ins. Co:, 51 Fed.
715 ; Cooper v. Alut. Accident Assn. 57 Hun. 407; Barber v.
Ins. Co., 16 W. Va. 658; Hong Sling v. Ins. Co., 8 Utah,
135; Matt v. Ins. Co., 81 Iowa, 135 ; Chandler v. Ins. Co., 21
Minn. 85 ; Hay v. Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 607; German Ins. Co.
v. Davis (Neb.), 59 N. W. R. 698 ; McConnel v. Ass'n., 79
Iowa, 757; Spare v. Ins. Co., 17 Fed. 568 ; Vette v. Ins. Co.,
30 Fed. Rep. 668; Hart v. Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 77; Freizen v.
Ins. Co., 3o Fed. Rep. 352; Ellis v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co.,
64 Iowa, 507 ; Miller v. Ins. Co., 70 Iowa, 704; Sun Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Jones, 54 Ark. 376.
The following very respectable list of authorities hold, with
much sound reasoning and good logic, that the limitation
begins to run from the time stated in the policy, and not from
the time of the accrual of the cause of action: Virginia Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736; Ghio v. Ins. Co., 65
Miss. 532; Roach v. N. Y & E. Ins. Co., 3o N. Y. 546;
Ripley v. Ins. Co., 3o N. Y. 136; MfcElroy v. Ins. Co., 48 Kan.
200; State Ins. Co. v. Stoffels, 48 Kan. 205 ; Johnson v. Ins.
Co., 91 11. 92; Fullnan v. Ins. Co., 7 Gray (Mass.), 61;
Travellers' Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co., I N. D. 151 ; Cray, Recr. v.
Ins. Co., I Blatchf. 280 ; Meesman v. Ins. Co. (Wash.), 27 Pac.
Rep. 77; Grigsby v. Ins. Co., 4o Mo. App. 276; Wiliams
et al. v. fIs. Co., 27 Vt. 99; Lentz v. Ins. Co., 96 Mich. 445 ;
N. W. fits. Co. v. Pha'nix 0. & C. Co., 31 Pa. 448 ; Farmers'
Mtt Ins. Co. v. Barr, 94 Pa. 345 ; Steel v. Phianix Ins. Co.,
47 Fed. Rep. 863 ; Waynesboro Fire Ins. Co. v. Conover, 98 Pa.
384; Chambers v. Ins. Co., 5 1 Conn. 17; McFarland v. Ry.
0. & E. Accident Assn. (Wyo.), 38 Pac. Rep. 347; King v.
Watertown Ins. Co., 47 Hun. I; Thompson v.Phwniz Ins. Co.,
25 Fed. Rep. 296; Garido v. Ins. Co., 8 Pac. Rep. 512;
Tasker v. Kenton Ins. Co., 58 N. H. 496. The courts of New
Yo:k have not been at all uniform in their own decisions on
the question. They seem to have in some cases adapted a
strained construction of the particular wording of policies to
justify the contrary decisions. The case of Cooper v. U. S.
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Iut. Ben. Assn., 132 N. Y. 334, decided in 1892, was ar
action on an accident policy which undertook to pay the
beneficiary in the policy a certain sum in case of injury to the-
person, and in case of death of the assured, the Association
was to pay a specified sum to his wife. The policy provided.
that no suit should be commenced unless within one year next
after the injury. It was held that the widow, who was only
entitled to maintain an action in case of the death of the
assured, could maintain it on the policy for the death within
one year from the time the assured died, though such period
be more than a year from the happening of the injury which
caused death. This ruling is reasonable, however. The
policy provided that if assured should die in 9o days that the
wife should recover. The assured, under the policy, was
also entitled to certain indemnity whether the accident proved
fatal or not. The wife was only entitled to indemnity in the
event it did. Thus there were two beneficiaries under the
same policy. The assured himself was entitled to indemnity
from the moment he was injured; the wife not till his death.
The wife could not proceed to furnish proofs of loss under the
policy until the death of the husband. The husband could,
however, just as soon as injured. The fundamental rights of
the two beneficiaries in the policy are, by its terms, and the
possible results of the accident, placed at divergent times.
In the case of Steen v. Ins. Co., 89 N. Y. 315, the policy
required actions to be brought within twelve months after
the" loss or damage shall accrue." This clause in a policy
would doubtless justify the decision that the action could be
commenced within one year after the accrual of the cause of
action, as all provisions in a policy which are of doubtful
construction are construed strictly toward the insurer, and
liberally in favor of the assured: Vette v. Ins. Co., 30 Fed.
Rep. 668; Bradley v. Ins. Co., 28 Mo. App. 7; Mayor, etc-
v. Ins. Go., 39 N. Y. 35 ; Grant v. Ins. Co., 5 Ind. 23 ; Sun'
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jones, 54 Ark. 376. And the policies
sued'on in the cases of Mayor v. Ins. Co., 39 N. Y. 45 and
Hay v. Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 235, contained a clause similar
to the one considered in Steen v. Ins. Co., supra. Besides
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the court seems, in this latest case on the subject, to approve
the :ase of King- v. Ins. Co, 47 Hun I, which holds that the
limitation begins to run from the time of the loss. In the
case of Mat/her v. Ins. Co., 89 N. Y. 315, the court held,
disapproving the cases of Johnson v. Ins. Co., 91 Il 93 and
Fullman v. Ins. Co., 7 Gray (Mass.), 61, that the limitation
began to run, not from the time of the loss, but from the
accrual of the action. Thus it would seem at least a little
difficult to reconcile all the New York decisions on this point.
In H y v. Ins. Co., supra, the policy provided that no action
should be maintained unless within a stipulated time from the
"loss." The court seems to play upon this word, and finally
construes the policy to mean that it shall be sued on not later
than a certain time from the accrual of the cause of action
thereunder, instead of from the loss, as the policy plainly
says in unambiguous and simple language. The supreme
court of Arkansas has adopted this construction, following the
New York court. The case of Johnson v. Ins. Co., supra,
though assailed by the New York court, has been expressly
approved in the late cases of M cElrojy v. Ins. Co., 48 Kan. 200;
McFarland v. Rj,. 0. & E. Acc. Assn. (Wyo.), 38 Pac. Rep.
347; Virginia Fire & M. hzs. Co. v. WCells, 83 Va. 736, and
is in harmony with the case of Riddlesbarger v. Ins. Co.,
7 Wall. 386, and the many other cases herein cited as sustain-
ing the proposition that the limitation begins to run from the
time the policy says instead of the accrual of the action. In
the case of Thompson v. Ins. Co., 25 Fed. Rep. 296, the court
held that the limitation began to run from the date of the fire,
unless the assured was prevented in some way by the insurer
from bringing the action in apt time. The case went to the
Supreme Court of the United States where it was held that the
failure to bring the action within the time limited would excuse
the failure to bring it sooner, if the insurer led assured to
believe the claim would be paid without suit: Thompson v.
Ins. Co., 136 U. S. 287. On remanding the case by the
United States Supreme Court, it was again tried, in the Circuit
Court. That court again adhered to its former ruling that the
limitation period began to run from the date of the fire. It
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hel, further, that the insurer had not induced the assured not
to sue except for five months of the twelve provided in the
policy within which to sue, and the court held this seven
months left ample time in which to sue, and that the assured
did not commence his action in time, it having been more than
the twelve months after the fire. This last decision was
reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
the court holding that a delay in suing on the contract of insur-
ance for more than a year, which was superinduced by the
representations of the agents of the company that the claim
would be settled without a resort to the courts, was excusable
when caused by such representations: Steel v. Ins. Co., 5 I
Fed. Rep. 715.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, with the Supreme Court
of Arkansas, and perhaps some other courts, seems to take
the position that all the six or twelve months, as the case
may be, may be taken up in making proofs of loss and com-
plying with the conditions precedent contained in the policy.
But if the assured can consume a whole year in preparing
proofs of loss which, according to the stipulation in the policy,
must be furnished within sixty days, and which stipulation all
courts hold and agree to be a condition precedent to any-
recovery at all, when made such by the policy, why can he
not consume more than a year, or two years, or three, or an
indefinite time? Yet he unquestionably must furnish these
proofs as required by the policy, in manner and form laid
down by the insurance contract itself, or he must be forever
and all time barred from maintaining any action thereon:
Bowlin v. Ins. Co., 36 Minn. 433; Slapiro v. Ins. Co., 5i
Minn. 239; Gould v. Ins. Co., 90 Mich. 302, affirmed on
rehearing, Id. 3o8 ; Steel v. Ins. CO., 93 Mich. 8 i, and many
other cases that might be mentioned.
It is difficult to see how the courts can call the time of the
loss mentioned in the policy the time of the accrual of the
cause of action thereon. Surely, if the parties had intended
so simple and commonplace a word as loss to mean the time
of accrual of a cause of action, they would have embodied the
latter term in the contract, instead of the simple word "loss,"
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which has a plain, popular, commonplace and unambiguous
meaning, and is nowhere defined by any of the standard lexi-
cographers to mean the accrual of a cause of action. But it
is argued by some of the courts that all the provisions of the
policy must be taken together, and the policy construed as a
whole. But, taking this horn of the dilemma places such an
argument in no better attitude. Suppose a policy provides
that the action shall not be brought till sixty days after the
fire, and not later than one year therefrom. Construing these
provisions together, the suit must not be brought sooner than
the sixty days, nor later than the twelve months, or, in other
words, must be brought within the ten months that elapses
after the furnishing of the proofs and before the expiration of
the year. There is nothing unreasonable in such a require-
ment. A clause limiting the time within which to bring the
action to six months has never been held unreasonable, and
has often been held valid, though the assured must furnish
the proofs of loss within sixty days after the fire. A number
of cases to this effect may be found in the authorities cited to
sustain the limitation in its strict and plain terms.
In the case ofJohnson v. Ins. Co., supra, the Supreme Court
of Illinois, with much good sense and sound reason in discuss-
ing the question of the time of the occurring of the loss, say:
"'When did the loss occur? Manifestly at the time the fire
destroyed the property. In what consisted the loss ? Ob-
viously in the destruction of the building by fire. We are
wholly unable to perceive that language could have been used
that could have rendered the meaning plainer." In Bradley v.
Ins. Co., 23 Mo. App. 7, the court say: "When did the
loss occur? Certainly, on the day, at the instant, when the
property was destroyed by fire. The term employed in the
contract is apt and unambiguous." The policy in the case
provided that no action should be brought on the policy
unless within six months next after the loss should occur.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut discussed the same
question where a policy was sued on, containing the provision
that an action should be brought to recover thereon within
"twelve months next after an) loss or damage shall occur."
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The court, in passing upon this clause of the policy, say:
"This limitation is lawful and reasonable. In words of
common use and plain meaning, an event is referred to as a
start;ng point, that is, the destruction or injury to plaintiff's.
property by fire. It is certain they intended to surrender a
very large portion of the time allowed them by law; and there
is nothing either in the structure or the subject -matter of the
contract indicating their unwillingness to make the day of that
occurrence the point of departure, and to agree that the period
of twelve months therefrom should cover the making of the
proofs, the sixty days of grace to the defendant and the insti-
tution of the suit. The contract keeps the day upon which a
fire occurs entirely distinct from the day upon which the right
to sue for indemnity accrues. Each is described in plain and
appropriate language. We find no reason for the assumption
that when the first is mentioned the last is intended, and it is not
for us, by construction, to give the plaintiffs what they failed to.
secure by agreement:" Chambers v. Ins. Co., 51 Conn. 17.
And the Supreme Court of Virginia, in considering an action on
a policy which stipulated that "No suit or action shall be
maintained in any court upon this policy unless the same be
instituted within six months next succeeding the day upon
which the loss or damage is alleged to have taken place,"
among other things, said: "It is undeniable that a policy
must be construed with reference to all its provisions like any
other contract. And it may not be gainsaid that the condi-
tion of a policy should be construed, if possible, so as not to
defeat the claim of the assured, which, in effecting the insur-
ance, it was his purpose to secure. But there is no sounder
rule of construction than that when the terms and stipulations
of a contract are plain and clear, we are bound to adhere to
the terms, as the only authentic expression of the intention of
the parties. None would be rash enough to claim that there
is obscurity or ambiguity in the language in which is expressed
the prohibition to institute an action upon this policy after six
months next succeeding the time when the loss is alleged to
have taken place.. -The position is that the sixty days in
which the company is entitled to delay the payment of the
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'loss incurred by the fire should be eliminated from the six
-months. Had such been the intention of the parties, how
easy it would have been so as to have expressed that inten-
tion. But there is nothing in the policy, which is clear and
unambiguous in its terms, to indicate any such intention:"
Va. Fire & lf Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736. The conclusions
of these courts evince sound reason, common sense and good
logic and are in harmony with the best considered cases and
the clear weight of authority. The loss of the property is
that which is insured against, not the production of the proofs
of that loss. The insurer is not, in law, supposed to lose any-
thing. The loss to the assured by reason of the fire is the
loss in every proper sepse. The insurer for a valuable consi-
deration undertakes to pay the assured the loss by fire su.s-
tained. It is in a sense a guarantor, and binds itself to indem-
nify the assured against loss. The contract of insurance, the
payment of the premium, and the loss by fire, or the accident,
etc., are the fundamental elements of liability. The furnish-
ing the proofs of loss is only an initial step to be taken look-
ing to an action. This can and must be done in a certain time.
And if, after the proofs of loss are furnished, and the other
-conditions precedent of the policy are complied with on the
part of the assured, and there remains a reasonable time before
the expiration of the stipulated limitation period in the policy
for bringing the action, the assured will be required to take
advantage of that opportunity, or his claim must be adjudged
forever barred. No court, certain!y, would close its doors to
the litigant who has been as diligent as a reasonable person
-could be required to be in complying with conditions prece-
dent in his policy, and, in spite of this due diligence, the limi-
tation clause has elapsed. In cases of this kind the courts
would not hesitate to hold that, the assured having done all
that could have been required of him and used proper dili-
gence to get his claim in apt condition for a suit, will be en-
titled to maintain it, and against such a suitor, the doors of
justice never should be closed. In harmony with this princi-
ple. it has been held that where the last day of the limitation
prescribed by the contract falls on Sunday, the assured will be
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permitted to maintain his action if begun on the Monday fol-
lowing: Owen v. Hozvard Ins. Co., 87 Ky. 571. See, also,
Edmonson v. Wragg, 1O4 Pa. 501; L. R. & Ft. S. Ry. v.
Dean, 43 Ark. 529.
Sometimes it is not an easy matter to ascertain with pre-
cision, the exact time when the cause of action under an in-
surance contract accrues. This inquiry may be of much
importance, too, in those jurisdictions where it is held that the
limitation period does not begin to run "until the cause of action
first accrues. To avoid any doubt or difficulty, the prudent
practitioner will bring his actions in seasonable time; but this
is not always done, and it then is necessary often to stretch
the terms of the policy all they will admit, in order to show"
a right to come into court at all. Thus, where the insurer
flatly denies any liability whatever, and unconditionally re-
fuses to pay the loss alleged to have been sustained, this will
place the company and the assured at arms length, as it were,
and the cause of action, if well founded in fact, will become-
mafure at once. The limitation period will then be set in
motion, and it becomes the duty of the insured to proceed at
once with his action. After such renunciation by the company
of any liability, he cannot then wait and make his proofs of-
loss at any time within the sixty days, because these are dis-
pensed with by reason of the general denial of liability. Upon
such general repudiation of any liability by the insurer, the
right of action is complete, and the period of limitation begins
to run: HarO'ord Fire Ins. Co. v. Josey (Tex.), 25 S. W. R.
685 ; Allegre v. Ins. Co., 6 H. & J. 408; Tayloe v. Mercantile.
F. Ins. Co., 9 How. 390; Daniher v. Grand Lodge A. 0. U.
W. (Utah.), 37 Pac. R. 245; Lazensky v. Supreme Lodge
K'gzts of Honor, 31 Fed. R. 592 ; Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co.
v. Pendleton, I 12 U. S. 696; Continental Ins. Co. v. Chew,
(Ind.), 38 N. E. R. 417; German Ins. Co. v. Frederick, 58
Fed. R. 144; Vankirk v. Ins. Co., 79 Wis. 627; Plhenix Ins.
Co. v. Bachelder, 32 Neb. 490; German Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 53
Ark. 494; California Ins. Co. v. Grade, 15 Colo. 70 ; Pcenixr
Ins. Co. v. Weeks, 45 Kan. 751 ; Steamship Samana v. Hall,
55 Fed. R. 663 ; Hahn v. Ins. Co., 23 Ore. 576 ; Savage v-
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111s. Co., 12 Mont. 458; Sheanon v. Ins. Co., 83 Wis. 507;
Steppv. Ins. Co., 37 S. C. 417; Dialv. Ins. Co., 29 S. C.
560; Weiss v. Ins. Co., 23 Atl. R. 991 ; Lebanon ftt. Ins. v.
Erb, 112 Pa. 149; YoUng v. Ins. Co., '92 Mich. 68; East
Tezas Fire Ins. CO. v. Brown, 82 Tex. 631 ; American Central
Ins. Co. v. Sweester, 116 Ind. 370; Niagara Ins. Co. v. Lee,
73 Tex. 641; Com. Union Ins. Co. v. Scammon, 12 N. E.
324; Kansas Protective Union v. Whtitt, 14 Pac. R. 275;
Unsell v. Ins. Co., 32 Fed. R. 443 ; Pha'nix Ins. Co. v. SPiers,
87 ICy. 285; Gernan Ins. Co. v. Gueck, 130 Ill. 345; Sun
Miut. Ins. Co. v. Mattingly, 77 Tex. 162. The courts have
uniformly held that the requirements of proofs of loss; to
submit to arbitration; to furnish certificate of a magistrate or
officer; and, in short, that any or all the conditions precedent
prescribed in the policy, are for its advantage; and, if it
chooses to do so, it may waive them or any of them. When
they are so waived, they become, for all purposes of the
bringing of an action after the waiver, just as though they had
never been incorporated into the contract of insurance:
Gooden v. Amoskeag Fire Ins. Co., 2o N." H. 73 ; McFarland v.
Ins. Co., 6 W. Va. 425; Miwkey v. Ins. CO., 35 Iowa, 174;
Veile v. Ins. Co., 29 Iowa, 9; Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Kin-
niers, 28 Gratt. 88;. Gans v. Ins. Co., 43 Wis. lO8; Franklin
Fire Ins. Co. v. Chcago Ice Co., 36 Md. 102; Grant v. Ins.
Co., 5 Ind. 23; Coursin v. Ins. Co., 46 Pa. 323; McFar-
landv. Ins. Co., 134 Pa. 590; Keenan v. Ins. Co., 12 Iowa,
126; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Davenport, 37 Mich. 609;
Jennings v. Ins. Co., 148 Mass. 61 ; St. Paid F. & M. Ins. Co.
v. McGregor, 63 Tex. 399; Home Ins. & B. Co. v. Meyer, 93
Ill. 271 ; Continental s. Co. v. Chew (Ind.), 38 N. E. R. 417 ;
Heidenreich v. Ins. Co. (Ore.), 37 Pac. R. 64; Merchants Ins.
Co. v. Gibbs, 29 Atl. 485 ; Western Home Ins. Co. v Richard.-
son (Neb.), 58 N. W. R. 597; Tripe v. Prov. Fund. Soc.,
14o N. Y. 23 ; Enos v. Ins. Co. (S. D.), 57 N. W. R., gig;
Vergeront v. Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 425 ; Emory v. is. Co., 88 Cal.
300; Bromberg v. Ins. Co., 45 Minn, 318; Morely v. Ins. Co.,
85 Mich. 21o; Waiverv. Ins. Co., 153 Mass. 335; Continen-
tal Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 45 Kan. 250; Green v. Is. Co., 84
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Iowa, 135 ; Wrght v. Ins. Co., 12 Mont. 474; Carpenter v.
Ins. Co., 135 N. Y. 298; Star U. L. Co. v. Finney, 35 Neb.
214; Fishery. Ins. Co., 33 Fed. R. 544; Travellers Ins. Co. v.
Harvey, 5 S. E. R. 553 ; Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers,
19 Ill. 474, and many other cases.
But the courts will not construe every suggestion that the
company may make to the assured to be an unqualified waiver
of all the conditions precedent. For instance, it may be
objected by the insurers that the proofs of loss have not been
furnished in apt time; that they are not sworn to as required;
that there is no certificate of the nearest magistrate as to the
loss; that immediate notice of loss was not given as required;
that there was fraud in procuring the insurance; that there
were false answers to questions in the application upon which
the insurance was based. An objection of this kind would
doubtless be a waiver of any other similar defence not speci-
fied. But any number of such objections could not be held
to be a waiver of the clause requiring suit to be brought
within a year, because there would be nothing in such objec-
tions leading to the assured to believe that such a stipulation
would not be insisted upon, and for the further reason that in
the very nature of things, this limitation stipulation would not
be waived unless the assured at the trial failed to set it up as a
defense. It has until the time of trial to plead this in bar.
Every one of these objections could be made before the time
of bringing suit expired. But such objections would doubtless
waive a stipulation that the proofs of loss were not furnished
within the time specified, or that they were not full and com-
plete, or that there had been no arbitration, etc. Generally,
the requirements to submit more perfect proofs of loss, or
some other objection to the non-compliance with a condition
precedent to a right to sue, could in no way affect the right of
the insurer to set up the limitation period, or false swearing, or
fraud in procuring the insurance, or any breach of the war-
ranties in the application or policy. These go to the found-
ation of the action. They are matters of defence that will
not be considered waived unless it clearly appear from the
facts that the company has done or omitted some act which
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may have induced assured, acting with reasonable prudence,
to have relied on the assumption that the company would not-
plead or set up such defence. And if the conduct of the
company in connection with a loss under its policy be such
as to justify any one of ordinary intelligence in believing that
the claim will bc settled without a suit, and, relying on this
representation, the assured defers bringing his action, until
after the period of limitation expires, the action may neverthe-
less be maintained within a reasonable time thereafter: St.
Paid Fire & Af. I s. Co. v. McGregor, 63 Tex. 399.
In Home Ins. & Banking- Co. v. e)'er, 93 Ill. 271, suit was
brought on a policy within the time prescribed. The company
after the action was begun promised repeatedly to pay the loss,
insisting that there was no need to resort to the courts to
enforce collection. The suit was pending for about two years,
and finally dismissed for want of prosecution. Like promises
were made by the company after the suit had been dismissed
for want of prosecution. An action was subsequently brought
on the same policy, and it was held that the promises and
assurances of the company that the claim would be paid
without suit were a sufficient excuse, not only for the failure to
prosecute the first action, but for not bringing the last within
the limitation period as well. But the mere fact that there may
be negotiations carried on between the parties looking to a set-
tlement will not toll the limitation period stipulated in the con--
tract of insurance, unless there be an express agreement that
the limitation be suspended pending the negotiation: Goodenr
v. Is. Co., 20 N. H. 73; JfcFarland v. Ins. Co., 6 W. Va. 425.
But any holding out by the company that would naturally
and reasonably lead the assured to defer his action will estop.
and preclude the company from setting up any defense that it
may have inveigled the assured into losing by reason of such
inducements : Dwelling House Ins. Co. v. Brodie, 52 Ark. I I
Biat v. Hawkcye Ins. Co., 69 Iowa, 184 ; M:iller v. Ins. Co.,
70 Iowa, 704; Eg-esion v. Ins. Co., 65 Iowa, 308; foore v.
Is. Co., 64 N. H. 140; Ames v. Ins. Co., 14 N. Y. 253; Ripley
v. Ins. Co., 3o N.Y. 136; ThomPson v. h;s. Co., 136 U. S. 287.
This principle is unquestionably right. The law requires
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good faith and fair dealing on the part of both the assured
and the insurer as well, It would be contrary to equity and
good conscience, as well as manifestly unjust, to permit the
insurance company to profit by its own unfair acts and conduct,
which have resulted in the injury of its adversary whom it has
thus made its confiding victim.
In a case where the company was notified of a loss, and it
replied that the matter was in the hands of its state agent, and
advised the assured to be patient, it was held that this was no
waiver of the condition requiring proofs of loss to be furnished
-within a certain time. And though such letter be written
.before the proofs are furnished, yet the cause of action on the
policy will not accrue until this condition be complied with:
,German Ins. Co. v. Davis (Neb.), 59 N. W. R. 698.
Again, where a loss occurred, and assured was advised by
-the company that an adjuster would be on hand at a certain
time, and for assured to get his appraiser ready. This was
held not to obviate the necessity of proofs of loss: Harrison
v. Ins. Co., 59 Fed. Rep. 732. Likewise, a letter acknowl-
edging receipt of a notice of loss, and stating that the claim of
the assured would receive prompt attention, does not waive
the requirement that proofs of loss be first furnished before com-
mencing suit: Kirkman v. Ins. Co. (Iowa), 57 N. W. R. 952.
Where the contract of the parties requires that a certain
condition precedent shall be performed, if it is attempted to be
complied with by the assured and he fail, the failure of the
company to require more is but silence, and silence is not
a waiver of tfie condition: Keenan v. Ins. Co., 12 Iowa, 126.
So, where the assured furnished the proofs of loss after the
time stipulated and the company thereupon denied any liability
because the proofs were not furnished in time. The assured
thereupon sent additional proofs, but the company remained
,silent thereafter. It was held that this was not a waiver of the
condition requiring proofs to be furnished: Peninsular L. &
T. Mfg. Co. v. Franklin Ins. Co., 35 W. Va. 666.
Ahid where the insurance company received proofs of loss
.and claimed that the policy was void, it was held that the
.company was not precluded from setting up the limitation
6
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clause in the policy in bar: Vore v. Ins. Co., 76 Iowa, 548.
By the mere fact that an adjuster of the company visited
the place of the fire and offered to compromise the claim of
assured upon a certain basis, which offer was refused by the
assured, it was held that the clause requiring proofs of loss
was not waived: Maddox v. Ins. Co., 39 Mo. App. 198.
Nor does the failure of the company to demand proofs of
loss and furnish blanks therefor waive the requirement that
proofs be furnished before the cause of action accrues : Con-
d'nental Ins. Co. v. Dorman, I25 Ind. 169.
Where the adjuster of the company visits the place of fire
and makes an offer of settlement which is rejected by assured,
and threupon the adjuster tells assured that he will have to
proceed under his policy, this is not a waiver of the conditions
in a policy required to be performed before suit brought:
Knudson v. Hekla Ins. CO., 75 Wis. 198.
The failure of an insurance company to object to the proofs
of loss furnished, while waiving the necessity of further- proofs,
does not waive the sixty days allowed by the policy within
which to pay the insurance after the proofs are received. The
failure to object to the proofs is nothing more than the receiv-
ing proofs properly made out, and the privilege of delaying
payment for sixty days after receipt of proofs is retained in any
event. So, in cases of this kind, the cause of action will not
accrue until the expiration of the sixty days: German-Ameri-
can Ins. Co. v. Hocking, 115 Pa. 198.
In the case of Steel v. Ins. Co., Judge Deady held, that
where the insurance company had held out inducements and
allured the assured into not suing the company for a time, but
that the inducements were withdrawn and seven months of the
limitation period was still left within which to sue, that this
time was sufficient and reasonable, and that assured was barred
for not bringing the action within that time. This doctrine is
controverted in a late case determined in the Supreme Court of
Illinois, affirming the ruling of the appellate court of that
state : Illinois Live Stock Ins. Co. v. Baker, 38 N. E. R. 627.
It is there held that where the company has once waived the
limitation period, it cannot be revived, and that the claim
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can then be considered by the assured as governed by the
general statute of limitations. The question is not.without
some difficulty, but it would seem on principle that if the
company should notify the assured that it would insist on
every defence provided by the policy, though it had pre-
viously estopped itself from claiming the limitation stipulation,
it would be reasonable to hold the assured to the period pro-
vided by the policy from and after such notice. The parties
in limine contracted with reference to this stipulation. By
allowing the assured the full period after he is notified that his
claim will be resisted because not brought in the twelve
months, we will say, he is then in statuo quo. He is just
-%here he was before the clause was waived. He is not
injured by reason of the inducements not to sue, if he
!has notice that he must proceed under his policy and is
allowed the full tithe that would have been allowed had he not
been misled. And though the insurer may have acted in bad
faith or fraudulently with assured, and thereby have induced
him to postpone his action too long, yet when he is put on
notice that he will have to sue, he is not injured if he have
as long thereafter in which to sue as he would have had if he
had not been misled. As a general rule, fraud will not
entitle any one to relief which he could not have had before
the fraud if he has not been injured by the fraud or bad faith.
And in all cases, as a general rule, where a waiver or estoppel
is relied on by the assured to toll the limitation period, the
,onus is on the party alleging the waiver, not only to show it,
but to establish that the person waiving the provision had the
authority to do so: German Ins. Co. v. Davis, 59 N.W. R. 698.
It is generally held that a clause in a policy requiring any
differences that may arise to be submitted to arbitrators is
valid. And when such submission to arbitrators is made
a condition precedent by the terms of the policy, it must be
complied with before an action can be brought: .17futual Fire
Insurance Co. v. Alvord, 61 Fed. Rep. 752. These stipulations
in the policy, if they do not have the effect of ousting the
courts of their jurisdiction, but simply provide for ascertain-
ing the amount of the loss, are held valid and binding. The
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courts can, nevertheless, be resorted to to inforce the payment
of the loss found by the arbitrators. In such instances, suit
can only be brought after the award, and for the amount found
by the arbitrators. See Hamilton v. Ins. Co., 136 U. S. 242;
Liveipool L. & G. Ins. Co. v. TMolf, 50 N. J. L. 453 ; Hall v.
Ins. Co., 57 Conn. 1O5 ; Hanover Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 28 Fla.
209; Gauche et al. v. Ins Co., io Fed. K. 347 ; Adams v. Ins.
CO., 70 Cal. 198 ; Old Sancelito L. & D. Co. v. Ins. Co., 65
Ca!. 368. But where the policy does not stipulate that the
making of the award is a condition precedent to the bringing
of the action, it may be commenced, so far as the arbitration
clause is concerned, at any time: iltittal Fire Ins. Co. v.
Alvord, 61 Fed. Rep. 752; Crossley v. Ins. Co., 27 Fed. Rep.
30 ; Hamilton v. Ins. Co., 137 U. S. 370 ; Seward v. Rochester,
l09 N. Y. 164; Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v. Pulver, 126 Ill.
329; Smitl v. Assn, 51 Fed. Rep. 520.
. The limitation clause in policies of insurance is usually in-
serted for the benefit of the insurer, though it results in an
advantage to the honest policy holder. These limitation
clauses are founded upon the general experience of mankind.
In a sense they are based upon the observed result of events.
They hasten diligence on the part of the insurer, and require
him to present his claim for indemnity while the circumstances
of the loss entitling him thereto are vivid in his mind, and
can be intelligently and fairly presented and contended for.
They protect the insurer, too, by placing a limit on the time
within which the action may be brought, and prevent suit at a
late day when time may have to a large extent, and perhaps
totally, destroyed evidence that might defeat a dishonest
recovery. The law presumes that one having a good cause of
action will not needlessly delay from time to time until it may
be difficult for him to establish his claim with reasonable cer-
tainty on the one hand, and equally as difficult for'the com-
pany to resist a claim that may not be just, on the other. "It
is not an unreasonable term that, in case of a controversy
upon a loss, resort shall be had by the assured to the proper
tribunal, whilst the transaction is recent and the proofs respect-
ing it are accessible:" Riddlesbarger v. Ins. Co., 7 Wall. 386.
Nashville, Ark. W. C. RODGERS.
